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Abstract 
Open market repurchase programs provide firms with the flexibility to manage the cash and 
risk aspects of their operations. This paper therefore aims to determine whether cash and risk 
matter only at the implementation stage in the sequence of a repurchase program: 
announcement, implementation, and withdrawal. We do find that temporary cash and risk 
measures only affect the implementation decision, while partially negating the traditional 
signaling effect around program announcement. The relevance of the flexibility afforded by 
the early announcement of a repurchase program is also evidenced by a steadily increasing 
time-to-event probability of repurchase implementation and program withdrawal. 
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I. Introduction 
 Share repurchases typically offer executives greater flexibility over the timing of cash 
distributions than dividend payments. This is because when a firm announces an authority to 
repurchase shares, it gains an option to return cash to its shareholders without any 
commitment to actually doing so. The extant literature has generally modeled the decision to 
actually implement a repurchase transaction without conditioning on its position in the 
sequence of events comprising a repurchase program. In particular, by decoupling these two 
stages and modeling the implementation likelihood conditional on the preceding 
announcement of an authority, we attempt to embed into the analysis the optionality inherent 
in a share repurchase program. The aim of this paper is to determine the most important 
drivers of decision making at each stage of the repurchase sequence from program 
announcement through program implementation or non-implementation and, finally, to 
program renewal or withdrawal.1 By examining how firm financial characteristics, especially 
those of cash and risk, evolve before, during, and after such a sequence, we offer new insight 
into the conditions under which these decisions are taken. 
 Examining the determinants of repurchase decisions in the UK regulatory setting is 
important. Under Rule 10b-18 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), firms in 
the U.S. are not required to obtain shareholder approval in order to initiate a repurchase 
program. Additionally, it is not mandatory for firms to announce a program initiation to the 
market, although doing so is a matter of compliance with stock exchange rules.2 Furthermore, 
it is only since 2003 that U.S. firms have been required to report their actual repurchase 
transactions to the SEC on a quarterly basis. Given the limited disclosure of U.S. firms’ 
                                                 
1 See Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998), and Fenn and Liang (2001) for some examples of independent analyses of different repurchase 
decisions. Dittmar (2000) makes an early attempt to address the importance of the different objectives of open 
market repurchases in a unified framework. 
2 Irrespective of whether an announcement is made, firms in the U.S. are protected from litigation through safe 
harbor provisions under the stock price manipulation specifications of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
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intentions concerning repurchase programs, it is of no surprise that the prior literature 
typically relies on signaling models to analyze these corporate payouts. In such a setting, an 
authority to repurchase shares will only be obtained by firms most likely to execute it. This is 
because, as Oded (2005) suggests, if a firm has no intention to repurchase (i.e., it signals 
falsely), then it exposes itself to the negative costs associated with a higher than intended firm 
valuation. 
 In contrast, in the UK, a company’s board is required to seek shareholder approval at 
an Annual General Meeting (AGM) or Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) for a program 
of specified length (maximum of 18 months) and scale (typically up to 15% of the company’s 
capital). Once the authority has been granted, the firm can exercise this right without further 
approval from either the shareholders or the board. However, they must report transactions by 
the next trading day (unlike within a quarter in the U.S.). The authority is typically renewed 
on an annual basis owing to its limited validity. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) argue that 
in this type of setting, the signaling value of repeat announcements will be reduced, thereby 
limiting the likelihood that a repurchase program will be motivated by firm undervaluation.3 
 The greater restrictions imposed on UK firms have different implications for signaling 
value at the initiation and implementation stages of a repurchase program. Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996) argue that the importance of signaling a higher firm value is diminished 
when there is a longer delay between the initiation and implementation of a repurchase 
program. Moreover, if a delay is possible, the early announcement of a program has a more 
diluted effect on firm value when compared to, in particular, fixed price tender offers as 
studied by Comment and Jarrell (1991). Thus, while Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) 
describe a repurchase program in the U.S. as a free option, in the UK, they are more 
accurately described as a marginally constrained, but flexible option to repurchase. These 
                                                 
3 We thank the referee for this valuable suggestion. 
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differences between the UK and U.S. are more than regulatory in nature as they also allow us 
to underline points of debate within corporate payout policy. 
 The UK setting enables us to fully analyze the sequential and conditional phases that 
comprise a repurchase program. Specifically, UK firms first choose to initiate an authority, 
which is identified as the first time a firm seeks approval from its shareholders for a 
repurchase program, conditional upon having no prior authority. However, since renewal of 
an authority might incrementally indicate a potential change in payout policy, we also 
analyze the likelihood of all program announcements (i.e., first initiations pooled with 
renewals). Once an authority is obtained, firms decide whether or not to exercise the authority 
to repurchase. In contrast to Oswald and Young (2008), we evaluate the likelihood of 
implementation only among those firms that already have the authority to do so. The final 
decision of whether to withdraw an authority can occur either post-implementation or without 
exercising the authority to repurchase. Therefore, we analyze the withdrawal decision 
conditional upon having obtained an authority to repurchase reflecting the joint probability of 
withdrawal with or without the exercise of that authority. 
 Given that signaling theory is less relevant for UK firms announcing repurchase 
programs, this regulatory setting is expected to provide a stronger test of the flexibility 
objectives proposed by Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach (2000). In this paper, we are primarily concerned with two major drivers of the 
flexibility afforded to firms with the option to repurchase shares. First, Jensen (1986) and 
others have hypothesized that free cash is likely to be an important determinant of share buy 
backs since they can assist firms in reducing the associated agency costs. In disentangling the 
effect of free cash, Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al. (2000) find that 
repurchasing firms are more likely to use temporary changes in cash for open market 
repurchases, while any changes in permanent levels of cash will make it more likely that the 
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firms will instead resort to increasing dividends. In addition, Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
suggest that firms use free cash to repurchase in order to reduce the overall risk of the firm, 
rather than to improve its performance. As such, the level of systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
may also be an important determinant of repurchase decisions. We analyze the relative 
importance of these two measures, cash flow permanence and firm risk, in the open market 
repurchase process described above. 
 Without properly accounting for the conditional nature of the different decisions 
comprising a repurchase program, an analysis of the determinants of each phase is likely to 
be biased. This is also an issue as the relevance of each determinant in the transition between 
decision points (authority to implementation, and authority to withdrawal) is likely to vary in 
degree of importance. In this regard, cash flow and firm risk levels are not expected to 
influence each and every program decision at their conditional points in time. For example, if 
firms seek the flexibility afforded by a repurchase program, they will not want their cash flow 
and firm risk levels to provide any signals to the market when initiating an authority to 
repurchase shares. Consistent with the early adoption hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996), firms will only undertake a repurchase transaction when their cash flow 
and/or risk levels justify it. The impact of flexibility on the withdrawal decision is more 
difficult to disentangle as it reflects the joint probability of either implementation or non-
execution. The standalone probability of program implementation, however, aids the 
withdrawal decision the closer the program is to its completion. Therefore, post-
implementation, firms will have weaker incentives to renew their authorities since the cash 
and risk drivers that enabled them to buy back shares are likely to have now disappeared. 
Firms that withdraw without having made any actual repurchases will have lower 
implementation expectations, thus further reducing the impact of the cash and risk drivers in 
influencing the program withdrawal decision. 
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 Consistent with our expectations discussed above, we find the decision to announce a 
repurchase program does not appear to be influenced by either cash or risk. However, surplus 
cash is significant in influencing a firm’s decision to implement a repurchase program, which 
is consistent with most prior findings (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al. 2000; 
Oswald and Young, 2008). Furthermore, our results also reveal the importance of 
idiosyncratic risk to the implementation decision, a negative association that is as important 
economically as surplus cash. The findings on firm risk extend the results of Grullon and 
Michaely (2004), who only consider the role of share repurchases in reducing overall firm 
risk. The importance of cash and firm risk are also evident in a time-to-event model. Surplus 
cash and firm-specific risk are found to be economically important drivers of share 
repurchases as they increase the hazard rate (probability of event occurring) of 
implementation, which, in line with the predictions of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), is 
more likely to occur three to four years after initiation. Post-implementation, lower 
permanent cash flows (operating and investing) only are found to drive the withdrawal of a 
repurchase authority. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theory 
behind the drivers of the flexibility objective posited for open market repurchase programs. 
Section III describes the sample and variables used, while also discussing the repurchase 
decision models and methodology adopted when addressing our research questions. Section 
IV presents and discusses our findings for the likelihood and time-to-event (survival) models, 
examining the effect of the cash and risk drivers at each phase of a repurchase program. 
Finally, Section V provides our conclusions. 
 
II. Drivers for Repurchase Flexibility 
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 There has been much discussion concerning the validity of the different objectives 
proposed for share repurchases. As discussed in the previous section, repeat announcements, 
disclosure timing, and the multiplicity of disclosures around announcements reduce the 
validity of a signaling argument for open market repurchase programs in the UK. Thus, under 
UK legislation, the discretion afforded to firms when making decisions concerning 
repurchase programs is expected to provide a more rigorous test of the flexibility objectives 
proposed by Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) and Jagannathan et al. (2000). In addition, the 
conditionality of repurchase decisions makes the drivers for flexibility important at specific 
(not all) sequential stages in a repurchase program. In the following two subsections, we 
explore the validity of the flexibility arguments from the perspectives of agency costs of free 
cash flow and firm risk. 
 
A. Cash Flow 
 An often cited objective behind a firm’s decision to repurchase shares in the open 
market is the availability of free cash flow. This objective is likely to be most prominent 
among firms that are relatively large and with few investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986). 
Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al. (2000) demonstrate that temporary changes 
in cash flow are likely to motivate firms to repurchase shares, while also indicating that more 
permanent changes in cash flow are likely to result in dividend payments. Furthermore, 
Billett and Xue (2007) identify how firms use transitory cash when making open market 
repurchase decisions. 
 In the UK setting, Oswald and Young (2008) identify the conditions (incentive 
alignment and external monitoring) under which management might reduce the agency 
problem of free cash flow through share repurchases. They consider the impact of cash on 
share repurchases on the basis of its operational use in a firm. Their flow measure of cash is 
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synonymous with the normal use of cash for the operating and non-operating activities of a 
firm. In contrast, their stock measure, which corresponds to current cash and cash 
equivalents, relates to cash levels in excess of those required by a firm to conduct its normal 
activities on an ongoing basis. We use these two measures of cash in light of the temporary 
cash objective of Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al. (2000). 
 While Oswald and Young (2008) only examine implementations, our analysis centers 
more on the conditional nature of each decision within an open market repurchase program 
and how cash, as one of the drivers for flexibility, influences the respective transitions. Cash 
is not expected to be a systematic determinant of each decision stage of a repurchase 
program. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) suggest that firms that announce a repurchase 
program do not face any ongoing costs of signaling, especially when the program is 
repeatedly renewed. Thus, if the objective behind firms announcing programs early is to 
avoid signaling costs, then temporary cash is unlikely to be the driver of these 
announcements. In contrast, and consistent with the findings in the extant literature, 
temporary cash can guide the decision to repurchase stock since repeat announcements of 
programs will minimize the signaling effect. Similarly, as firms are unlikely to withdraw 
programs in the presence of significant cash (Billett and Xue, 2007), cash measures are more 
likely to be negatively or insignificantly related to the probability of program withdrawal. 
Although it may be a free option, firms may seek to withdraw an authority if they face a 
difficult business environment and are unable to generate sufficient cash to make payouts to 
shareholders. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) argue that retaining an authority at a time of 
distress could potentially have an impact on a firm’s reputation. 
 
B. Firm Risk 
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 As an alternative to the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) propose that when free cash flow is used by firms to repurchase shares, it 
can have a greater effect on mitigating risk than on improving performance. As firms 
transition from a high growth to a mature phase in their life cycle, their investment 
opportunity set shrinks leading to lesser risk, a lower cost of capital, and higher free cash 
flow. This has the potential to lead to over investment by firms. However, Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) only associate the impact of risk with systematic changes, and not with an 
idiosyncratic measure. Therefore, we extend their argument by disentangling the effects of 
market and firm-specific risk on the different decisions involved in a repurchase program. 
 As for the signaling argument in the dividend payout research, firms are inclined to 
announce a repurchase program when they are faced with increased systematic risk in an 
attempt to mitigate their perceived undervaluation. However, as Ikenberry et al. (1995) and 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue, it is highly unlikely that all firms will find 
themselves undervalued at the same time. In contrast, changes in idiosyncratic risk will serve 
as a signal. Because of this, they are unlikely to be a determinant of program initiation. The 
same holds true for authority renewals since any value from the announcement signal is 
strongest at the time of first initiation (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). Thus, changes in 
systematic risk, and not idiosyncratic risk, are a possible driver of program announcements. 
Consequently, a firm’s transition from high growth to a mature phase in its life cycle can lead 
to lower idiosyncratic risk, providing a motive to repurchase shares in order to avoid 
overinvestment. Alternatively, firms may seek to repurchase shares in order to increase their 
investment opportunity set (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). The preceding discussion 
attests to the potential importance of idiosyncratic risk at the implementation stage only in a 
repurchase program. 
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 Similarly, the drivers for flexibility can also motivate program withdrawal. Firms may 
be inclined to withdraw an authority when they face negative systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks, bringing them close to financial distress. However, the impact of the risk drivers on 
program withdrawal is more likely to be prominent when firms engage in implementation 
prior to withdrawal or during the life of the authority. As firms in the UK incur little or no 
costs in obtaining authorities to repurchase shares, program withdrawals are likely to be rare 
events. Notwithstanding the potentially long period between initiation and withdrawal of an 
authority, firms that have a higher implementation probability based on the risk drivers are 
also likely to see an impact on their withdrawal decisions. In contrast to those firms that 
implement an authority, repeated renewals in the absence of implementation can lessen the 
importance of the risk drivers. As such, the risk measures may be positively or insignificantly 
associated with the withdrawal decision probability for these firms. 
 We define the proxies for the cash and risk drivers for the flexibility of repurchase 
programs in the next section. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
A. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 As discussed in Section I, in the UK, repurchase authorities are usually obtained 
through either AGM or EGM notices, the particulars of which are distributed to the 
shareholders. Additionally, the latest time for firms to disclose their repurchase executions is 
the trading day following the original repurchase day. Information on this latter decision 
component, which we use to ascertain the likelihood and speed of repurchase 
implementation, is not readily available through secondary sources. Thus, to capture the 
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entire decision process, we independently gather information on repurchase authorities and 
implementation, as well as program withdrawals, from Perfect Information (PI).4 
 We follow Rau and Vermaelen (2002) in using the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database to obtain a list of UK public companies with announcements of repurchase 
programs.5 Although the SDC database is prone to some bias toward firms with higher 
implementation rates (Banyi, Oyl, and Kahle, 2008) and lower announcement period returns 
(Oswald and Young, 2004), other important control variables, such as firm size, do not 
depend upon the choice of this database. Using SDC yields a list of 196 UK companies 
(excluding financials and utilities) who have obtained a repurchase authority from 1990-
2010. Through the use of AGM and EGM notices, as well as daily repurchase disclosures that 
fall within the sample period, we construct two datasets for the sample firms. We first pool all 
of the firm years from 1990-2010 during which the sample companies are active. This pooled 
sample comprises 2,762 firm years, which includes 1,923 firm year observations of 
repurchase authority announcements (including authority renewals). We subsequently 
identify 10,623 disclosures of daily repurchase executions, which, in order to avoid the use of 
different time scales and to present a consistent methodology, we aggregate into firm year 
totals. We obtain accounting and financial information through Datastream/Worldscope 
(DW). The construction of the cash and risk variables is discussed in the next two 
subsections. Definitions for all primary and control variables, together with the relevant DW 
codes, are provided in Table I. 
 
Insert Table I about here. 
 
                                                 
4 PI is a database of primary documents released by a firm as part of its legal disclosure to the Regulatory News 
Services (RNS) in the UK. 
5 SDC incorporates announcements of programs (either completed, pending, status unknown, tentative, or 
withdrawn), limited to repurchases of at least 5% of a company’s total shares outstanding or 3% of a company’s 
shares if the transaction value is $1 million or more. 
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B. Computing Cash Flow Measures 
 We follow Oswald and Young (2008) in using two proxy measures for cash. The flow 
components are intended to capture the use of cash in daily business activities (operating and 
investing), while a stock measure encapsulates cash levels in excess of operating and 
investing requirements. We measure the separate flow components as excess cash flow from 
operating and investing activities. These excesses are computed based on the difference 
between current scaled cash flow and the average of the lagged and forward-looking 
measures of scaled cash flow. For the stock measure, we first compute Equation (1) using a 
standard linear regression framework for each year in the sample period (1990-2010). Surplus 
(temporary) cash is then estimated for each firm year as the residual (𝜀𝑖) from the equation. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑊𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 
                                           +𝛾5𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
 
In Equation (1), cash and cash equivalents (CCTAi) is cross-sectionally regressed on 
measures of firm size (LTAi), free cash flow (FCFi), working capital requirements (WCi), firm 
leverage (LEVi), research and development expenses (RDSLi), investment opportunity 
(MTBVi), and a dummy variable indicating a dividend paying firm (DPDummyi). 
 We also construct a dummy variable to control for the agency cost of free cash flow, 
as generally proposed by Jensen (1986). The Agency indicator variable identifies firms that 
have (operating) free cash above the industry median, while also having investment 
opportunities below the industry median level. Oswald and Young (2008) stress the 
importance of agency-based measures in ascertaining the probability of repurchase 
implementation. However, since we model dependence between successive decisions in 
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repurchase programs, it is essential, and possible, to consider whether agency issues are 
persistent for decisions beyond that of obtaining an authority to repurchase shares. 
 
C. Computing Risk Measures 
 Grullon and Michaely (2004) argue that the rationale for share repurchases may have 
more to do with managing risk than in utilizing cash to improve firm performance. Therefore, 
it is important to simultaneously consider how market-related and firm-specific risks 
influence the probability of successive decisions in repurchase programs. To disentangle the 
impact of risk, we employ the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model in a panel regression 
framework as provided in Equation (2). 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
In Equation (2), the risk-adjusted firm annual return (Returni,t – RFt) is regressed on the 
market premium (RMRFi,t), the difference in return between small and large firms (SMBi,t), 
and the difference in return between value and growth firms (HMLi,t).
6 
 Systematic risk is then computed as the standard deviation of the explained 
component of Equation (2), which captures the non-diversifiable component of overall risk. 
Additionally, unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk is estimated as the standard deviation of the 
error term (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) reflecting the firm-specific drivers of investment and financing decisions not 
captured by the specification of the three-factor model. 
 
D. Research Methodology 
                                                 
6 Data on the UK specific factors of the regression were obtained from http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/. See Gregory, Tharyan, and Christidis 
(2009) for a detailed description regarding their computation. 
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 Figure I illustrates the importance of modeling dependence between successive 
decisions in UK repurchase programs. 
 
Insert Figure I about here. 
 
The initial standpoint from which all subsequent decisions are conditional is the initiation of 
an authority to repurchase shares in the open market. Firms enter the sample without any 
authority to repurchase stock. Having obtained such an authority, a firm moves from a state 
with no authority (State 1) to one with authority (State 2), as illustrated by Path 1 in Figure I. 
This initial transition accounts for 174 observations from the 1,923 total firm years with 
repurchase authorities. We are primarily interested in these 174 cases of authority initiation, 
relative to the 839 firm years with no authority.7 However, we additionally pool initiations 
and renewals of authority in a similar panel setup with the same control firm years. 
 We model the likelihood that a firm will obtain an authority using Equation (3). 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(Pr(𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝐴𝑛𝑛. ) |𝑁𝑜𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ. )
= 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
 
In Equation (3), the binary decision of authority announcement, conditional upon no 
prior authority, is regressed against the proxies for surplus cash (SCAi,t), excess operating 
                                                 
7 The 174 initiation firm years are lower than the 196 companies in the sample, owing to left censoring around 
the year 1990 of companies that were active before the start of the sample period. The 839 firm years with no 
authority are obtained by subtracting the 1,923 firm years with repurchase authorities from the total 2,762 firm 
years in the sample period. 
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cash (ECFOi,t) and excess investing cash (ECFIi,t), and the indicator variable for firms with 
potential agency problems linked to free cash flow (Agencyi,t). The Logit regression also 
includes the proxies for systematic (SRiski,t) and idiosyncratic (IRiski,t) risk. Finally, we add 
the standard control variables of firm size (LTAi,t), firm leverage (LEVi,t), investment 
opportunity (MTBVi,t), dividend payout ratio (DPi,t) and a control for its non-linearity 
(DPDummyi,t), earnings per share (EPSi,t) and a control for its non-linearity (EPSDummyi,t), 
and three-month lagged firm price returns (LRETi,t). The specification also includes firm (𝜔𝑖) 
and year (𝜑𝑡) fixed effects. 
 A firm is not obliged to repurchase shares in the open market during the life of an 
authority. However, any repurchase transactions that do occur need to be disclosed by the 
next trading day and, subject to trading restrictions, these executions can occur on a regular 
basis. This implementation transition is illustrated in Figure I, where a firm in State 2 (i.e., 
with an authority) follows Path 2.1 (implementation) if it chooses to repurchase; otherwise, it 
follows Path 2.2 (no implementation).8 Using Perfect Information, we are able to identify 
10,623 repurchase executions for 159 firms in the sample.9 We use the number of repurchase 
days (as a proportion of the number of trading days in a calendar year), the number of shares 
repurchased (as a proportion of the total shares outstanding), and the total value of the shares 
repurchased (as a proportion of the firm’s market value) to annually aggregate the 
implementation data. We model the implementation transition using Tobit Equation (4), with 
left censoring at zero. 
 
                                                 
8 The decision to implement/not implement is not a state in Figure I, as this decision can be taken at any time 
during a fiscal year, after which a firm returns to its original state, with authority. 
9 The number of firms that implement is lower than the 176 firms in the sample as some firms choose not to 
repurchase shares. 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(Pr(𝐼𝑚𝑝. ) |𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝐴𝑛𝑛. )
= 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 (4) 
  
In Equation (4), we consider the likelihood of implementation conditional upon 
having initiated an authority in the past by using the restricted sample of 1,923 firm years 
with a repurchase authority. The specification used here is similar to Equation (3), although 
the explanatory variables are time lagged. This is because, unlike authority announcements, 
repurchase transactions can occur over a period of time after their original announcement. 
Thus, when we aggregate information, which is forward looking, we need to consider the 
lagged effect of the independent variables. 
 Since authorities for open market programs entail no commitment, the decision to 
withdraw depends jointly on implementation or non-implementation. The UK regulatory 
framework enables us to identify instances when the withdrawal of an authority occurs, 
which is most often when a firm decides not to renew an existing repurchase authority. This 
marks the transition from State 2 to State 3, represented by Path 3, in Figure I. In our sample, 
we are able to identify 76 firm years where repurchase authorities are withdrawn.10 We use 
the withdrawal firm observations and control for each with the identified firms’ 
announcement years only, resulting in a total of 348 firm year observations. Similar to the 
decision to obtain an authority, the withdrawal decision is a binary outcome, the likelihood of 
                                                 
10 This number is lower than the 196 firms present in our sample for two reasons. First, not every firm chooses 
to withdraw at all during the entire sample period. These firms are right censored in our regression. In addition, 
some firms choose to withdraw, but later reintroduce an authority within three years of last renewal. We exclude 
these cases from our subsample. 
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which we are able to assess in the presence of the cash, risk, and control variables using Logit 
Equation (5). 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ. ) |𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝐴𝑛𝑛. )
= 𝛽1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
 
 In addition to the likelihood models described above, the structure of the UK 
disclosure environment also enables us to consider the survival functions for firms that 
implement and withdraw their repurchase authorities in our sample period. We utilize the 
annual renewal process of repurchase programs in the survival models to ascertain whether 
firms implement or withdraw each year. In the case of implementation, this analysis enables 
us to incorporate a firm’s ability to repurchase shares multiple times, rather than just once, as 
is the case with a standard discrete-time survival model. In the case of withdrawals, 
repetitions of such actions are not considered and firms drop out of the sample once an 
authority is terminated. Thus, the survival functions for both repurchase implementation and 
program withdrawal are assessed using a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model, 
with intensity 𝜆(𝑡), through Equation (6). 
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𝜆(𝑡) = Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 + 1|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡)
= 𝜙1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙2𝐸𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙3𝐸𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙4𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙5𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜙6𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙7𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙10𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜙11𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙12𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙13𝐸𝑃𝑆𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙14𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
 
In Equation (6), T corresponds to the time-to-event, where the event in question is 
either implementation or withdrawal, and t relates to the time of the decision to initiate an 
authority that all subsequent decisions are conditional upon. The likelihood of 
implementation or withdrawal is adjudged on the basis of the occurrence of such an event in 
any given year. The importance of the regressors in the hazard model above will be revealed 
by their role in increasing the likelihood of implementation or withdrawal in any given time 
frame. The cash and risk variables, and the standard control factors, are used in the same 
manner as in Equations (3) and (5). 
 
E. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table II provides some descriptive statistics for our sample of UK open market 
repurchase programs. 
 
Insert Table II about here. 
 
Cluster-robust t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test results are also presented for differences in 
means and medians, respectively, (Wooldridge, 2010) across sample groups that are 
partitioned according to the different decision paths (announcement, implementation, and 
withdrawal). The initiation (first authority) and overall announcement (first and renewed 
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authorities) subsamples compare differences in means and medians between announcement 
and prior non-announcement firm years. The implementation subsample compares firm years 
with implementation against those with announcements, but no implementation. Finally, the 
withdrawal subsample compares firm years with withdrawals against all of those with 
announcements. 
 First, we consider differences in means and medians of the cash components across 
the sample groups. The most prominent and consistent differences are for surplus cash, but 
only for the implementation and withdrawal subsamples. These differences reveal a 
significantly higher (lower) value for firms that implement (withdraw). While we also 
observe similar differences in the excess cash variables, they are not consistently significant 
across both mean and median. The Agency dummy mean and median are also found to be 
significantly higher (lower) for the implementation (withdrawal) subsample. This suggests 
that firms that implement are at risk of otherwise overinvesting their excess cash. 
 Examining the firm risk components across the sample groups yields similar results to 
those of the cash variables. In contrast to Grullon and Michaely (2004), we find that the 
implementation (withdrawal) subsample has significantly lower (higher) systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk. Although we also observe some significance for idiosyncratic risk in the 
initiations subsample, the univariate findings for cash and risk are broadly in line with our 
expectation that, in the UK, the motivation behind announcing an open market repurchase 
program is less about immediate signaling and more about giving firms the flexibility to 
manage these aspects of their operations at an appropriate point in time. The control 
variables, with the exception of firm leverage and three-month lagged returns, differ 
significantly across the sample groups, justifying their inclusion when modeling the 
likelihood of different repurchase decisions. 
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IV. Likelihood of Repurchase Decisions 
 In this section, we present the results for conditional likelihood regressions of firms 
undertaking announcement, implementation, and withdrawal decisions. Using a conditional 
regression model in a setup that is multi-path has potential specification issues as conditional 
probabilities further down the chain can be affected by the marginal probabilities of earlier 
decisions (Train, 2009). Therefore, we also consider a type-II likelihood model for both 
implementation and withdrawal decisions. Our tests largely reveal insignificant differences 
between the two specifications for both decisions.11  
 
A. Likelihood of Program Announcement 
 First, we employ the specification of Equation (3) to analyze the overall sample of 
firms that make program announcements (Column (1) of Table III). Using a similar 
specification, we also consider the subsample of firm years for which the announcement is 
the first time an authority was sought to repurchase shares (Column (2) of Table III). 
 
Insert Table III about here. 
 
 Consistent with our univariate results, we do not observe any significance across the 
temporary and permanent measures of cash in either specification. This suggests that program 
announcements do not signal the presence of abnormal cash levels in a firm and aligns with 
our expectation that firms do not necessarily announce intentions to repurchase immediately. 
Additionally, we find a negative coefficient on the agency dummy in Column (1) indicating 
an economic and statistical significance of 3.2% lower probability of an authority 
                                                 
11 We also compute a correlation matrix to capture the univariate relations between the variables in our sample. 
As expected, the two risk variables are highly collinear. Checking for multicollinearity by separately excluding 
each risk component does not change the statistical and economic significance of our findings. The same applies 
for the cash variables. The correlation matrix and modified regression results are available upon request. 
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announcement for firms with potentially more acute agency problems.12 However, this 
variable does not retain significance when considering program initiations alone in Column 
(2), thus providing further support for the notion that firms first obtain an authority when they 
are least expected to repurchase. 
 Also consistent with our expectations, we find that neither the systematic nor 
idiosyncratic components of firm risk influence the decision to initiate (or announce) an 
authority. The insignificance of the cash and risk variables emphasizes the flexibility that 
firms seem to value when considering the adoption of open market repurchase programs. The 
univariate test results for idiosyncratic risk (Table II) are in contrast to our multivariate 
findings here indicating the relevance of controlling for other determinants of program 
announcements. 
 With respect to the control variables used in the specifications, we find that firm size 
is significantly related to the decision to obtain an authority. Economically, we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in firm size increases the probability of program announcement 
by approximately 24.5%, which is consistent with the agency argument.13 However, we do 
not find any statistical significance for the investment opportunity set (proxied by the market-
to-book ratio). We also find evidence contrary to the objective, often cited by firms for 
obtaining an authority to repurchase shares, of improving earnings per share. 
 
B. Likelihood of Repurchase Implementation 
 Obtaining an authority to repurchase shares in the open market is different from 
actually buying back stock. While a firm is not obligated to undertake a repurchase 
transaction, it is essential to condition the implementation decision on the existence of the 
                                                 
12 All probabilities are computed by multiplying the instantaneous marginal effect coefficients by their 
respective standard deviations, as shown in Table II. 
13 In a different context, Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that small firms are more likely 
to use tender offers due to the signaling effect. 
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underlying authority to do so. We use three alternative variables to model the conditional 
likelihood of the implementation decision as described in Section III. To simplify our 
analysis, we aggregate the detailed daily information into annual totals. These scaled totals 
then become the dependent variables in our likelihood analysis using Equation (4). The 
results are presented in Table IV.14 
 
Insert Table IV about here. 
 
 Our results for the cash and risk variables are essentially the same across the three 
different proxies for implementation. Consistent with the flexibility objective, we find that 
firms choose to implement when they have significant surplus cash and, as such, are more 
prone to free cash flow agency problems. In economic terms, for a one standard deviation 
shift in surplus cash, we observe a significant increase in implementation probability by 
eleven trading days. For an equivalent change in surplus cash, we find a significant increase 
of 3.7% (3.3%) in the proportional number of (value of) shares repurchased. 
 The Agency dummy captures the importance of free cash in share repurchases when 
firms have fewer investment opportunities, thus increasing the likelihood of overinvestment. 
There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between this variable and the 
likelihood of implementing a repurchase. In terms of economic significance, there is an 
increase of sixteen repurchase days when a firm is classified as having potential agency 
problems (Agency = 1). This status also leads to a 6.5% (5.2%) increase in the proportional 
number (value) of shares repurchased. This finding is broadly in line with those of Guay and 
Harford (2000), Jagannathan et al. (2000), and Oswald and Young (2008). However, our 
results applies after conditioning the likelihood of implementation on the presence of having 
                                                 
14 The number of observations used here (1,847) is marginally lower than the total number of announcement 
firm years (1,923) as some observations fall out of the sample owing to missing data. 
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an authority to so. Also, we quantify the magnitude of the change in implementation 
probability relative to changes in the measures of cash. 
 The agency problem of free cash and the overinvestment issue also imply an increase 
in repurchase probability when firms have significantly lower idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) argue that an increase in market-
related risk, associated with firm cash levels, can lead to firms being potentially misvalued 
providing them with an incentive to repurchase shares. Our findings in Table IV align with 
both of these predictions. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation 
increase in idiosyncratic risk leads to twelve fewer repurchase days or a 4.6% (4.1%) 
reduction in the number (value) of shares repurchased. Furthermore, a one standard deviation 
increase in systematic risk leads to an equivalent proportional increase in the number and 
value of shares repurchased. Although the results for systematic risk in Column (1) of Table 
IV are statistically insignificant, economically it amounts to five extra repurchase days for a 
one standard deviation change in systematic risk. The findings for idiosyncratic risk are 
consistent with the univariate results presented in Table II, whereas those for market-related 
risk are reversed. 
 With respect to the control variables, we determine that larger firms are more likely to 
implement repurchases. However, similar to our findings for repurchase announcements, we 
do not find any statistical significance for the investment opportunities proxy. We also find 
that implementing firms are under-leveraged suggesting that if a target leverage exists, firms 
will seek to repurchase shares in order to increase this ratio (Dittmar, 2000). Additionally, our 
findings do not fully corroborate the notion that firms announce programs with the intention 
of improving earnings per share (EPS). While the EPS variable itself is insignificant, a 
dummy variable identifying firms with positive EPS (EPSDummy) results in 86 fewer 
repurchase days and a 30.5% lower implementation probability for these firms (based on 
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repurchase value). Thus, while firms may not initiate authorities based on EPS levels, 
repurchase implementation seems to occur when EPS turns negative. This finding further 
highlights the flexibility afforded to firms by having a repurchase authority in place. 
 
C. Likelihood of Program Withdrawal 
 Unless voluntarily undertaken, firms do not explicitly announce their intention to 
lapse or withdraw an existing repurchase authority. Nevertheless, the sequential nature of 
repurchase decisions in the UK means that program withdrawal can be identified as the first 
year in which an authority is not renewed. As such, the decision to withdraw a repurchase 
program is conditional upon the joint probability of implementation or non-implementation. 
However, to permit a more comprehensive analysis, we first consider the overall case of 
withdrawals conditional upon program announcements, and then the two subsamples based 
on implementation. We analyze the likelihood of these events using Equation (5). The results 
are expressed in Table V. 
 
Insert Table V about here. 
 
 In the absence of ongoing signaling costs, firms are expected to repeatedly renew their 
repurchase authorities unless structural changes in their operating environment occur. As 
observed in Column (1) of Table V, none of the cash and risk variables have any significance 
in terms of explaining program withdrawal per se. Note that these results differ from the 
univariate findings in Table II, highlighting the relevance of the control variables. Although 
we find significance for some of the control variables, only leverage and the dividend payout 
dummy remain consistent across Columns (1) and (2). The finding for the payout dummy 
emphasizes the importance of dividends to a firm’s overall payout policy. Specifically, the 
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results indicate that if a firm starts to pay dividends, then the likelihood of program 
withdrawal drops by 12%. 
 The motivation behind a decision to withdraw a program post-implementation is 
likely to be somewhat stronger than if there has been no implementation. Our findings in 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table V provide support for this conjecture. Post-implementation, we 
find that only the flow measures of cash have a significant (at the 10% level) influence on the 
decision to withdraw. This amounts to a 4.7% and 5.6% decline in the likelihood of program 
withdrawal for a one standard deviation increase in excess operating and investing cash, 
respectively. The importance of the risk variables is also subdued, with both the systematic 
and idiosyncratic drivers lacking any significance. Thus, while risk seems to be as relevant a 
determinant as cash for the implementation decision, only flow measures of cash sustain 
relevance for the decision to renew or withdraw an authority. In the absence of 
implementation, the cash and risk drivers do not influence the withdrawal decision. Although 
the results are robust to different specifications, care is needed in their interpretation as the 
sample selection process yields a relatively small withdrawal dataset. 
 
D. Hazard Analysis of Repurchase Implementation and Program Withdrawal 
 To reinforce the findings from the likelihood regressions, we also perform a hazard 
analysis of program implementation and withdrawal.15 Using Equation (6), we are able to 
consider the importance of the cash and risk measures and other control variables that drive a 
firm to time repurchase decisions following a program announcement. As for the earlier 
likelihood models, the implementation decision accounts for multiple repurchases during the 
life of an authority, while program withdrawal is treated as a one-time only decision. Our 
standard hazard model findings are presented in Table VI. 
                                                 
15 Also known as a survival function, this analysis evaluates the cumulative probability of a hazard or event not 
occurring. It is also called a time-to-event analysis. 
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Insert Table VI about here. 
 
 Consistent with the likelihood models in Table IV, in Column (1) of Table VI, we 
continue to find that surplus cash, the agency dummy, and idiosyncratic risk play a role in 
guiding the decision to repurchase shares. A one standard deviation increase in surplus cash 
leads to an 8.2% increase in the probability of implementation, while for those firms 
classified as having potential agency problems, there is an increase in the same probability by 
nearly 20%.16 We also find that the risks associated with over investment are as important as 
surplus cash in the timing of implementation decisions. A one standard deviation change in 
idiosyncratic risk reduces the probability of implementation by 20%. The control variables 
also yield qualitatively similar results to those presented in Table IV.  
 Panel A of Figure II illustrates the non-implementation survival curve for firms with 
repurchase authorities. The likelihood that a firm will keep an authority active without 
implementation remains over 70% until four years after initiating the authority. However, this 
probability falls sharply after eight years to about 25% and to 20% after ten years. As such, 
consistent with the early adoption hypothesis of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), firms are 
more likely to announce their repurchase programs some time ahead of when they plan to 
actually implement them. 
 
Insert Figure II about here. 
 
 Column (2) in Table VI presents our results for repurchase withdrawals in the context 
of a survival function. Reinforcing our findings for the associated likelihood models (Table 
                                                 
16 Although the findings have greater economic significance when compared to the equivalent results presented 
in Table IV, it is important to note that the hazard model uses a dummy variable to account for all 
implementations within a given year. 
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V), all of the cash and risk measures have no bearing on the time-to-withdrawal probability of 
a repurchase authority. The findings for the control variables are also essentially consistent 
with those in Table V. The one difference we observe is the significance of the continuous 
dividend payout variable, which indicates a higher withdrawal probability for increases in 
dividend payouts. This is puzzling in the context of overall payout policy as the importance 
of permanent cash in dividends (Jagannathan et al., 2000) renders open market programs of 
secondary importance. Notwithstanding, the dummy indicator of dividend payout continues 
to imply a negative association with withdrawal probability. 
 Panel B of Figure II illustrates the non-withdrawal survival function for firms with 
repurchase authorities. From the smooth trend observed, we infer that firms continue to 
renew their authorities for an extended period of time. The likelihood that a firm will 
continue to renew four years after an authority is first initiated is over 80%. This probability 
only falls to 50% after ten years implying that firms face limited constraints when obtaining 
authorities to repurchase shares in the open market. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Open market repurchase programs provide firms with the flexibility to buy back 
shares at their discretion without any commitment to do so. This calls into question the 
signaling ability of program announcements, while giving more credence to the idea that 
repurchase programs are motivated by the flexibility afforded to firms in managing their cash 
and risk environment. In addition, a repurchase program entails a sequence of decisions. 
Firms must first announce their potential to repurchase, before deciding whether to exercise 
their authority to do so. Finally, they need to decide whether to withdraw the program. The 
contribution of this paper is to model the likelihood and hazard rates of these sequential and 
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conditional decisions. This permits us to more robustly examine the extent to which cash and 
risk are important drivers of each decision comprising a repurchase program. 
 Consistent with the expectations of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), we find that 
firms concerned about minimizing the signaling costs associated with program 
announcements are unlikely to have cash flow levels influencing that decision. However, 
surplus levels of cash are uniformly found to influence a firm's decision to implement an 
authority. Additionally, our findings indicate a limited influence of cash in the decision to 
withdraw an authority, conditional upon whether any implementation was undertaken during 
the life of a program. 
 As an alternative to the free cash flow hypothesis, Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
suggest that firms are driven to repurchase shares in order to reduce their risk exposure rather 
than to improve their operating performance. Our findings confirm their predictions that 
firms are more likely to implement (but not announce) programs when exposed to higher 
systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk. The result for idiosyncratic risk is as 
economically important as the implementation finding for surplus cash. As for the 
announcement decision, neither component of firm risk appears to influence the decision to 
withdraw a repurchase program. 
 The sequential nature of repurchase decisions and the degree of disclosure in the UK 
also enable us to investigate the time-to-event probability of repurchase implementation and 
program withdrawal (since initial authority). This analysis is able to directly test the 
predictions of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), who propose that firms adhere to an early 
adoption strategy in order to avoid a costly repurchase that would result from an increase in 
the share price. Their prediction explicitly highlights the importance of a delay in authority 
implementation. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis, emphasizing the importance 
of cash and risk drivers in increasing the chance of implementation three to four years after 
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initiating an authority. However, the probability of program withdrawal remains relatively 
low. This is likely a result of the negligible cost involved in obtaining or renewing 
authorities. 
 Our findings on the conditional nature of repurchase decisions provide new and richer 
insight in to the cash and risk drivers extensively documented in the extant literature. Future 
research might address the significance and consequence of the very different regulatory 
regimes in the U.S. and UK when analyzing open market repurchase programs within a 
conditional framework similar to that used in this paper.  
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Figure I. Sequential Structure of Open Market Repurchase Decisions 
 
This figure illustrates the sequential nature of an open market repurchase authority in the UK. Excluding left-censored cases, 
firms begin with no repurchase authority in place (State 1). Firms can choose to either obtain an authority (and move to State 
2) or continue without an authority (State 1). The probability of this decision, illustrated as Path 1, is tested using Equation 
(3). Once at State 2, firms can choose to buy back shares in the open market, which can be done repeatedly during the life of 
an authority. This is illustrated by Path 2.1. Alternatively, firms can withhold buying back any shares during the life of an 
authority, and follow Path 2.2. The cumulative probability and time-to-event of this decision is tested using Equations (4) 
and (6), respectively. The decision whether to implement occurs while firms are still in State 2. A change of state occurs if, 
by the next annual general meeting or upon expiration of an authority, firms decide against renewing the authority. Thus, 
withdrawal of an authority occurs and firms, following Path 3, move to State 3. The probability and time-to-event of this 
decision is tested using Equations (5) and (6), respectively. 
 
  
No Prior Authority 
State 1 
Authority 
State 2 
Withdraw 
State 3 
Obtain Authority 
Pr(AuthAnn. | NoAuth.) 
Path 1 
Withdrawal of Authority 
Pr(With. | AuthAnn.) 
Path 3 
No Implement and Renew 
Path 2.2 
Implement and Renew 
Pr(Imp. | AuthAnn.) 
Path 2.1 
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Figure II. Survival Curves of Time to Action of Repurchase Decisions Since Authority Initiation 
 
This figure illustrates the survival curves of the decision to implement (Panel A) and the decision to withdraw (Panel B) a 
repurchase program, conditional upon having an authority to repurchase in place. The survival curve plots the probability 
(bounded between zero and one) of a firm continuing with an authority without implementation or withdrawal, plotted 
against years since first initiation. Both survival curves are obtained based on a discrete time approach, identical to the semi-
parametric approach highlighted in Equation (6), the results for which are presented in Table VI. The figure is truncated at 
Year 10 to enable a comparison across both models, as the withdrawal sample lacks sufficient variability (in a cross-
sectional, survival data form) for the model to obtain reliable estimates. 
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Table I. Variable Definitions 
 
This table describes the explanatory variables used in the likelihood and survival models, in addition to variables used to 
compute surplus cash (SCA) and systematic (SRisk) and idiosyncratic (IRisk) risk measures. Datastream/Worldscope codes 
are provided in parentheses, where appropriate. 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Description 
SCA Surplus cash measured as the residual from a yearly cross-sectional regression as follows: 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖 =
𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑊𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾7𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. 
ECFO Excess of cash flow from operating activities computed as the difference between the current scaled 
measure of cash flow (WC04860) and the average of the lagged and forward looking measures of 
scaled cash flow from operating activities. 
ECFI Excess of cash flow from investing activities computed as the difference between the current scaled 
measure of cash flow (WC04870) and the average of the lagged and forward looking measures of 
scaled cash flow from investing activities. 
Agency Indicator variable equal to one for firm years with free cash (WC04860 scaled by WC02999) above 
industry median and MTBV below industry median, zero otherwise. 
SRisk Systematic risk computed as the 12-month variance of the predicted component from the Fama-
French (1993) Three-Factor Model as follows: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. See Gregory et al. (2009) for data definition and computation.  
IRisk Idiosyncratic risk computed as the 12-month variance from the residual component from the Fama-
French (1993) Three-Factor Model as follows: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. See Gregory et al. (2009) for data definition and computation. 
LTA Firm size measured as the log-normalized value of total assets (WC02999). 
LEV Net leverage computed as net debt (total liabilities net of cash holdings: WC03251-WC02001) scaled 
by net assets (total assets net of cash holdings: WC02999-WC02001). 
MTBV Market-to-book ratio measured as market value (book value of debt: WC02999-WC03501, plus 
market value of equity: MV) scaled by the book value of assets (WC02999). 
DP Dividend payout computed as dividends per share scaled by earnings per share (WC09504). 
DPDummy Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is a dividend paying firm, zero otherwise. 
EPS Earnings per share computed as the net income available to common shareholders (WC01706) scaled 
by the number of common shares outstanding (WC05191). 
EPSDummy Earnings per share (EPS) dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if EPS is positive, zero 
otherwise. 
LRet Log-normalized, 3-month rolling returns computed based on share price (P) information, adjusted for 
splits and dilution. 
CCTA Cash and cash equivalents (WC02001) scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
WC Working capital computed as total current assets (WC02201) adjusted for cash and cash equivalents 
(WC02001) and total current liabilities (WC03101), scaled by total assets (WC02999). 
RDSL Research and development expenses (WC01201) scaled by total sales (WC01001). 
  
 36 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) of the explanatory variables, grouped by Cash Components, Firm Risk, and Control 
Variables, used in regression Equations (3)-(6) and presented in Tables III-VI. The sample comprises UK firms (excluding financials and utilities) with a repurchase program 
from 1990-2010. Definitions of all of the variables are provided in Table I. Summary statistics are presented for all firm years (Overall) and firm year subsamples of program 
announcements (all and initiations only), implementations, and withdrawals. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** 
respectively, for tests on differences in mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon rank sum test). Differences in means and medians are computed for the following firm year 
groups: Overall against Announcement (All), Overall against Announcement (Initiation), Announcement (All) against Implementation (All), and Announcement (All) against 
Withdrawal (All). 
 
Sample Statistic 
Cash Components Firm Risk Control Variables 
Surplus 
Cash 
Excess 
Operating 
Cash 
Excess 
Investing 
Cash 
Agency 
Systematic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Firm 
Size 
Leverage 
Market 
to Book 
Dividend 
Payout 
Dividend 
Dummy 
Earnings 
per Share 
EPS Dummy 
Lagged 
Stock 
Returns 
[SCA] [ECFO] [ECFI] [AGENCY] [SRisk] [IRisk] [LTA] [LEV] [MTBV] [DP] [DPDummy] [EPS] [EPSDummy] [LRet] 
Overall Mean -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.37 0.25 0.44 12.17 0.11 0.51 40.03 0.79 0.18 0.96 1.05 
Sample Median -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.18 0.37 11.74 -0.01 0.54 41.22 1.00 0.10 1.00 1.03 
(n=2,762) 
Std. 
Dev. 
1.02 4.89 1.57 0.48 0.24 0.28 2.29 5.83 3.60 26.16 0.40 2.56 0.18 0.23 
Announcement: Mean -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.36 0.25 0.44 12.47*** -0.01 0.54 41.83*** 0.81 0.27* 0.97 1.06 
All Median -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.19 0.37 11.91*** -0.01 0.54 42.81*** 1.00 0.12* 1.00 1.03 
(n=1,923) 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.19 0.10 0.22 0.48 0.24 0.27 2.27 3.38 0.29 26.15 0.39 2.74 0.18 0.23 
Announcement: Mean 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.41 0.25 0.48*** 11.86** 0.64 0.50 36.95 0.79 0.15 0.98 1.06 
Initiation Median -0.05 -0.01 0.00* 0.00 0.17 0.38*** 11.33** -0.01 0.52 38.44 1.00 0.11 1.00 1.04 
(n=174) 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.31 0.23 0.32 0.49 0.36 0.39 2.18 10.80 0.32 25.75 0.41 0.69 0.13 0.24 
Implementation: Mean 0.01* -0.01 -0.01* 0.41** 0.23** 0.40*** 12.73* -0.09 0.56 44.10* 0.92*** 0.38*** 0.99*** 1.05 
All Median -0.05*** 0.00 -0.01 0.00*** 0.17*** 0.32*** 12.26** -0.01 0.55 44.43* 1.00*** 0.16*** 1.00*** 1.02 
(n=495) 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.21 0.14 0.18 0.49 0.26 0.28 2.41 0.48 0.24 22.16 0.28 3.05 0.08 0.20 
Withdrawal: Mean -0.06* -0.01 -0.02 0.13*** 0.30** 0.57*** 11.15*** 0.11 0.66*** 25.52*** 0.39*** -0.56*** 0.89* 1.06 
All Median -0.12*** 0.00 -0.01 0.00*** 0.25** 0.53*** 10.68*** -0.01 0.59*** 7.39*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 1.00*** 1.00 
(n=76) 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.17 0.11 0.22 0.34 0.20 0.29 2.12 1.91 0.48 30.29 0.49 3.68 0.31 0.30 
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Table III. Likelihood Models of Firms Announcing a Repurchase Program 
 
This table presents the likelihood model (Equation 3) of the decision by UK firms (excluding financials and utilities) to 
announce a repurchase authority from 1990-2010. Column (1) aggregates the probability of all announcements against prior 
firm years when no authority existed. Column (2) presents the results for program initiations, which tests the likelihood of 
first authority only against the same set of prior firm years. All of the variables used in the regressions are defined in Table I. 
The coefficients capture the marginal effects of an instantaneous change in each independent variable on the probability of 
obtaining an authority. Cluster-robust z-values are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 All Announcements Initiations Only 
Surplus Cash 0.0118 0.0127 
[SCA] (0.36) (0.30) 
Excess Operating Cash -0.0003 0.0008 
[ECFO] (-0.04) (0.08) 
Excess Investing Cash 0.0058 0.0067 
[ECFI] (0.57) (0.50) 
Agency -0.0319** 0.0064 
[Agency] (-2.36) (0.32) 
Systematic Risk 0.0286 0.0188 
[SRisk] (0.85) (0.41) 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0350 0.0507 
[IRisk] (1.12) (1.02) 
Firm Size 0.1080*** 0.1185*** 
[LTA] (9.45) (4.96) 
Leverage 0.0004 0.0005 
[LEV] (0.48) (0.67) 
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0102 -0.0556 
[MTBV] (-0.41) (-1.50) 
Dividend Payout 0.0001 0.0004 
[DP] (0.32) (0.66) 
Dividend Payout Dummy -0.0456** -0.0231 
[DPDummy] (-2.02) (-0.59) 
EPS 0.0059 0.0077 
[EPS] (1.46) (0.92) 
EPS Dummy -0.0299 0.9597 
[EPSDummy] (-0.42) (0.02) 
3-Month Lagged Returns 0.0166 0.0526 
[LRet] (0.69) (1.45) 
Observations 2,762 887 
Implementation Control Yes No 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2223 0.1080 
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Table IV. Likelihood Models of Firms Implementing a Repurchase Program 
 
This table presents the likelihood model (Equation 4) of the decision by UK firms (excluding financials and utilities) to 
implement a repurchase authority from 1990-2010. Column (1) aggregates the measure of repurchase days in a financial year 
and tests the probability of repurchasing shares against prior firm years with authority, but no implementation. Column (2) 
presents the results for implementation based on the number of shares repurchased and against the same set of firm years 
with authority, but no implementation. Column (3) provides the results for implementation based on the value of shares 
repurchased, conditioned on the same set of firm years as for the other two specifications. All of the variables used in the 
regressions are defined in Table I. The coefficients capture the marginal effects of an instantaneous change in each 
independent variable on the individual repurchase measures. Cluster-robust z-values are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Repurchase Days Shares Repurchased Repurchase Value 
Surplus Cash 0.2163*** 0.1771*** 0.1596*** 
[SCA] (3.25) (2.72) (2.70) 
Excess Operating Cash -0.0029 -0.1026 -0.0708 
[ECFO] (-0.03) (-1.15) (-0.88) 
Excess Investing Cash -0.1023** -0.1118** -0.0925** 
[ECFI] (-2.20) (-2.45) (-2.23) 
Agency 0.0660*** 0.0646*** 0.0518** 
[Agency] (2.81) (2.82) (2.50) 
Systematic Risk 0.0818 0.1766** 0.1595** 
[SRisk] (1.02) (2.28) (2.28) 
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.1712*** -0.1649*** -0.1475*** 
[IRisk] (-2.69) (-2.70) (-2.65) 
Firm Size 0.0410*** 0.0113* 0.0139** 
[LTA] (5.77) (1.65) (2.21) 
Leverage -0.0096 -0.0154* -0.0112 
[LEV] (-1.13) (-1.86) (-1.51) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0778 0.0716 0.0697 
[MTBV] (1.60) (1.50) (1.59) 
Dividend Payout -0.0006 -0.0013** -0.0008 
[DP] (-1.11) (-2.34) (-1.63) 
Dividend Payout Dummy 0.0840** 0.1491*** 0.1251*** 
[DPDummy] (2.16) (4.54) (4.02) 
EPS -0.0152 0.0129 -0.0017 
[EPS] (-0.61) (0.52) (-0.08) 
EPS Dummy -0.3425** -0.1392 -0.3049*** 
[EPSDummy] (-2.15) (-0.95) (-6.17) 
3-Month Lagged Returns -0.0228 -0.0222 -0.0193 
[LRet] (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.48) 
Observations 1,847 1,847 1,847 
Wald Statistic 71.56 49.43 66.88 
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Table V: Likelihood Models of Firms Withdrawing a Repurchase Program 
 
This table presents the likelihood model (Equation 5) of the decision by UK firms (excluding financials and utilities) to 
withdraw a repurchase authority from 1990-2010. Column (1) aggregates the probability of all withdrawals against prior 
firm years when an authority existed. Column (2) presents the results for a subsample of withdrawals that occur post-
implementation and tests the likelihood of withdrawal if an authority has been implemented in the past against the same set 
of prior firm years with authority. Column (3) provides the results for a subsample of withdrawals when no implementation 
was undertaken, tested against firm years with authority. All of the variables used in the regressions are defined in Table I. 
The coefficients capture the marginal effects of an instantaneous change in each independent variable on the probability of 
authority withdrawal. Cluster-robust z-values are reported in parentheses. Results for EPSDummy are ignored because of its 
degree of collinearity to EPS. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Withdrawals 
Withdrawals: 
Implementation 
Withdrawals: No 
Implementation 
Surplus Cash -0.2229 -0.1077 -5.2062 
[SCA] (-1.16) (-0.44) (-1.51) 
Excess Operating Cash 0.0386 -0.4264* 3.7140 
[ECFO] (0.21) (-1.72) (0.96) 
Excess Investing Cash -0.0992 -0.2526* 12.8410 
[ECFI] (-0.89) (-1.86) (1.35) 
Agency -0.0542 -0.0463 -2.4339 
[Agency] (-1.00) (-0.66) (-1.16) 
Systematic Risk 0.0140 -0.0391 2.1812 
[SRisk] (0.15) (-0.31) (1.13) 
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.0483 0.0220 -0.7393 
[IRisk] (0.62) (0.23) (-0.63) 
Firm Size -0.0640 -0.0341 -2.6483 
[LTA] (-1.62) (-0.76) (-1.25) 
Leverage 0.1779* 0.2813* 1.0005 
[LEV] (1.70) (1.94) (0.63) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.3456** 0.2067 -0.4949 
[MTBV] (2.09) (0.88) (-0.55) 
Dividend Payout 0.0015 0.0015 0.0209 
[DP] (1.54) (1.15) (1.63) 
Dividend Payout Dummy -0.1242* -0.1592* -1.3905 
[DPDummy] (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.47) 
EPS -0.0044 -0.0106 1.3790 
[EPS] (-0.65) (-1.11) (1.73) 
EPS Dummy NA NA NA 
[EPSDummy] NA NA NA 
3-Month Lagged Returns 0.0942 0.1893 -2.3876 
[LRet] (1.56) (2.50) (-1.59) 
Observations 348 285 63 
Wald Statistic 0.2925 0.3587 0.7607 
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Table VI. Hazard Models of Firms Implementing and Withdrawing a Repurchase Program 
 
This table presents the hazard (survival) model (Equation 6) of the decision by UK firms (excluding financials and utilities) 
to implement or withdraw a repurchase authority from 1990-2010. The hazard model for implementation tests the likelihood 
of firms implementing an authority during the life of the authority. Similarly, the hazard model for withdrawal tests the 
likelihood of firms withdrawing an authority during its life. The hazard model for withdrawal requires a firm to withdraw its 
authority only once during the life of a program, while the implementation model is adjusted to incorporate a firm's ability to 
repurchase shares multiple times during the life of an authority. All of the variables used in the regressions are defined in 
Table I. All coefficients are presented as marginal effects, while cluster-robust z-values are reported in parentheses. Results 
for EPSDummy are ignored in the withdrawal regression because of its degree of collinearity to EPS. Statistical significance 
(two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Repurchase Implementation Repurchase Withdrawal 
Surplus Cash 0.3944* -0.6454 
[SCA] (1.64) (-0.98) 
Excess Operating Cash 0.0549 0.2438 
[ECFO] (0.27) (0.94) 
Excess Investing Cash -0.0692 0.1478 
[ECFI] (-0.38) (1.51) 
Agency 0.2188* -0.2881 
[Agency] (1.79) (-0.82) 
Systematic Risk 0.6161 0.2010 
[SRisk] (1.56) (0.28) 
Idiosyncratic Risk -0.7155* -0.5020 
[IRisk] (-1.96) (-0.91) 
Firm Size 0.0716** -0.1268** 
[LTA] (2.50) (-2.31) 
Leverage -0.1649* 0.3782 
[LEV] (-1.79) (0.72) 
Market-to-Book Ratio 0.8001*** 0.3182*** 
[MTBV] (3.09) (2.96) 
Dividend Payout -0.0036 0.0231*** 
[DP] (-1.24) (3.91) 
Dividend Payout Dummy 0.9832*** -1.6131*** 
[DPDummy] (3.85) (-2.82) 
EPS 0.0066 -0.1569*** 
[EPS] (1.16) (-6.24) 
EPS Dummy 0.0827 NA 
[EPSDummy] (0.08) NA 
3-Month Lagged Returns 0.0978 1.0604 
[LRet] (0.44) (1.48) 
Observations 1,847 348 
Wald Statistic 57.27 4820.76 
 
 
